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Introduction and summary
In this article, I illustrate how corruption can lower 
the rate of product innovation in an industry. This is 
important because, if many industries are subject to 
corrupt practices, the lower rate of innovation would 
result in a lower growth rate for the whole economy.1 
Actually, the view that corruption is closely related to 
economic development is widely held in practice: Poor 
African countries, such as Kenya and Zaire, are com-
monly believed to lose a considerable fraction of their 
gross domestic product (GDP) to corruption activities. 
Figure 1 illustrates the extent of this perception. It 
plots 2004 GDP per capita levels from the Penn World 
Table against the 2004 Corruption Perception Index 
constructed by Transparency International.2 Since a 
Corruption Perception Index number close to zero in-
dicates no corruption, figure 1 shows a clear negative 
relation between corruption and economic development. 
While a negative correlation between corruption 
and GDP per capita levels is highly suggestive of an 
actual link, it is not conclusive evidence. It may be the 
case that corruption is closely related to other variables, 
such as political instability, the extent of violence, or 
the combativeness of unions, among other factors, and 
that these other variables are the ones generating poor 
economic development outcomes. In addition, GDP 
per capita levels may be affecting corruption levels 
and not the other way round. To complicate matters 
further, the negative correlation between corruption 
indexes and GDP per capita levels could be a mere 
artifact: It may well be the case that low GDP per 
capita levels are biasing the subjective perception of 
corruption reported by survey respondents. To disen-
tangle the effects of corruption on economic develop-
ment, further analysis is needed.
In this article, I provide theoretical grounds for 
pursuing such an analysis: In particular, I explore the 
strategic interactions between producers and corrupt 
officials. The basic corruption scenario considered in-
volves three agents: an innovator, an incumbent pro-
ducer, and a corrupt government official. The innovator 
wants to enter business by potentially paying a bribe; 
the incumbent producer wants to preclude the entry 
of the innovator by potentially paying a bribe; and the 
corrupt official decides on allowing the entry of the 
innovator based on the bribes received. Key elements 
of the game are that the government official can make 
successive take-it-or-leave-it bribe offers to the produc-
ers and that the central government can never verify 
the actual payment of a bribe (with some probability, 
the central government can detect that the entry permit 
was misallocated but cannot prove the actual amount 
of the bribe paid). Under these assumptions and with-
in certain ranges, I show that the amount of bribes 
that the government official can collect can be very 
responsive to small changes in the probability of de-
tection or in the penalties imposed. In fact, the bribe 
payments are shown to be a discontinuous function  
of those variables. Since the resources devoted to in-
novation are continuously and inversely related to the 
bribes that producers must pay, this means that the 
amount of resources devoted to innovation is a dis-
continuous function of the probability of detecting 
corruption and of the penalties imposed. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In 
the next section, I discuss the related literature. Then, 
I describe the corruption game and characterize its 
solution. Next, I analyze the implications of the cor-
ruption game for innovation decisions. Finally, I draw 
some conclusions about my findings.30 1Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
Related literature
Systematic empirical evidence about the relation-
ship between corruption and economic development  
is hard to come by. A notable exception is the study 
by Mauro (1995). Using Business International  
Corporation’s indexes on corruption, red tape, and  
efficiency of the judicial system over the period 
1980–83 (now incorporated into the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit), Mauro was able to estimate the direct 
effects of corruption on economic development. He 
found that corruption lowers investment, even con-
trolling for other determinants of investment and en-
dogeneity effects. The magnitude of the effect is quite 
significant. Mauro found that a one standard deviation 
improvement in the corruption index is associated 
with an increase in investment of 2.9 percent of GDP. 
This means, for example, that “if Bangladesh were to 
improve the integrity and efficiency of its bureaucra-
cy to the level of that of Uruguay, its investment rate 
would rise by almost five percentage points, and its 
yearly GDP growth rate would rise by over half a 
percentage point” (Mauro, 1995, p. 705).
On the theoretical side, the literature has proceed-
ed along two lines. One, following Becker and Stigler 
(1974), used a principal–agent approach. In particular, 
it focused on the incentives that the central govern-
ment (the principal) can give a government official 
(the agent) to make him behave honestly. Another 
strand, following Shleifer and Vishny (1993), took 
the corrupt behavior of government officials as a giv-
en and analyzed the consequences that their behavior 
has on resource allocation. In this approach, corrupt-
ed officials are modeled as monopolistic suppliers of 
a government good (such as a passport, an import li-
cense, the right to use a road, etc.) that is supposed to 
be supplied at a prespecified price. The corrupt offi-
cial overcharges the government good to maximize 
his total revenues.
More recently, Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) took 
a broader approach. They considered a static econo-
my in which producers can choose to pay a cost in or-
der to produce with a clean technology (otherwise, 
their production process pollutes the environment). 
The government wants to tax polluters and subsidize 
clean producers in order to reduce the associated neg-
ative externality. However, it must rely on officials to 
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inspect the producers and determine their pollution 
status. The officials are assumed to be corrupt: Through 
bribes they are able to grab an exogenous share of the 
surplus, which is assumed to be equal to the sum of 
the tax and the subsidy that the official can potentially 
charge. As a consequence, the government faces an 
important trade-off between taxation and corruption: 
It wants to tax polluters, but in order to detect them it 
must rely on corrupted officials that consume resources. 
In this environment, Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) char-
acterize the optimal amount of taxation/corruption. 
While Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) were able to 
analyze the optimal taxation/corruption policy of the 
government, in order to do so they had to simplify the 
interaction between the government officials and the 
producers to a reduced form. My contribution to this 
literature is to spell out that interaction in an explicit 
game and analyze its implications in detail. Since 
Djankov et al. (2002) report that there are large dif-
ferences across countries in the regulation of entry and 
that this type of regulation is associated with sharply 
higher levels of corruption, I formulate the corruption 
game in the context of entry decisions to an industry.3
The corruption game
The corruption game is as follows. Consider the 
case of a product line that is supplied by a single pro-
ducer—the incumbent. The value of supplying the 
product line is given by V. In addition, there is a po-
tential producer that has just created a new product 
generation—the innovator. If the innovator is allowed 
to supply the new product, the incumbent will be driven 
out of the market. As a consequence, the innovator 
would obtain the value V and the incumbent would 
lose it. Entry is regulated: The innovator must receive 
permission from the government to enter business. The 
reason for the regulation is that the innovator may pro-
duce with a technology that pollutes the environment. 
The government is willing to grant the entry permit to 
the innovator only if the new production technology 
is clean. However, the government must send a gov-
ernment official to determine whether the new tech-
nology pollutes or not. Once the government official 
inspects the new technology, its pollution status be-
comes fully known to him. After the official learns 
the pollution status of the new technology, he must 
report it to the central government. If the official re-
ports that the new technology pollutes the environ-
ment, the innovator is precluded from producing but 
faces no additional penalties.4 
The government official is corrupt. He has the 
ability of misrepresenting to the government the true 
pollution status of the new technology. This allows 
him to try to extract a bribe, either from the incum-
bent or the innovator, in determining which report to 
make to the central government. For simplicity, I as-
sume that the pollution status of the new technology 
is fully known to both the innovator and the incum-
bent. This means that once the government official 
inspects the new technology, its pollution status be-
comes common knowledge to the three parties—the 
incumbent, the innovator, and the official.
The government never observes the actual bribe 
payment received by the official. However, once the 
official makes his report, with probability ϕ the gov-
ernment independently learns about the true pollution 
status of the new technology. If the official is found 
to have granted an entry permit to a polluter, there are 
penalties involved. In particular, the official is fined 
pV, while the innovator is fined mV. If the official is 
found to have rejected an entry permit to a clean in-
novator, there are also penalties involved: The official 
is fined pV, and the incumbent is fined mV.
The official is assumed to be able to make take-
it-or-leave-it offers. The key decision for the official 
is whether to request a bribe and from whom. In what 
follows, we will see that the best strategy for the offi-
cial is to turn to the producer with the largest joint 
surplus and make him a take-it-or-leave-it offer. How-
ever, for the producer with the largest joint surplus  
to accept this bribe proposal, it must be credible that  
the producer with the second largest joint surplus 
would be willing to accept a bribe proposal if offered 
one. This will require the second largest joint surplus 
to be positive.
In principle, two possible scenarios must be con-
sidered: the scenario in which the innovator does not 
pollute the environment and the scenario in which the 
innovator does pollute the environment. However, the 
two scenarios are completely symmetrical. In each 
scenario there is a “legal” producer and an “illegal” 
producer. In the case that the innovator pollutes, the 
legal producer is the incumbent; in the case that the 
innovator does not pollute, the legal producer is the 
innovator. Moreover, the payoffs to each player in the 
corruption game only depend on whether the bribes 
are being extracted from the legal producer or the il-
legal producer (that is, the payoffs are independent of 
the actual identity of the producers). Given this sym-
metry, in what follows I consider a single corruption 
game that differentiates producers only according to 
their legal status, with the understanding that the 
identities of the legal and illegal producers are deter-
mined by the actual scenario taking place.
Figure 2 describes the sequence of moves for the 
corruption game. In the first stage, the government  32 1Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
official must decide between three alternatives: 1) not 
to seek bribes, 2) to initially seek a bribe from the il-
legal producer I, and 3) to initially seek a bribe from 
the legal producer L. In the case that the official seeks 
a bribe, he must decide how much to demand from 
the producer he initially turns to (the continuum of 
values for the bribe are represented as the base of the 
triangles in figure 2). If the bribe request is accepted, 
the game ends. Otherwise, the official turns to the 
second producer and decides how much to demand 
from him. The game ends after this point. If this bribe 
request is rejected, the official assigns the production 
permit to the legal producer, since he has nothing to 
gain otherwise. In what follows, I analyze the way 
that the corruption game is played.
First, observe that the government official always 
has a larger joint surplus to share with the legal pro-
ducer than with the illegal producer. The reason is that 
the value of being the product leader is the same for 
both types of producers, but there are penalties involved 
if a deal with the illegal producer is subsequently de-
tected. In addition, the value of not being the product 
leader is the same for both types of producers (in par-
ticular, it is equal to zero). This means that the govern-
ment official will always want to extract bribes from 
the legal producer. However, for the legal producer to 
be willing to pay such a bribe, it should be credible 
that the government official would want to reach a 
deal with the illegal producer in a second round of 
negotiation. If this is not the case, the legal producer 
will reject any bribe request, since he 
knows that the government official will 
subsequently take the legal course of 
action.
Observe that the payoff to the illegal 
producer of reaching a deal with the gov-
ernment official is:
PI = V − BI − ϕ [V + mV],
where BI are the bribes paid. This payoff 
is equal to the value of being the product 
leader net of the bribe payment minus the 
losses if the deal is detected, an event that 
happens with probability ϕ. Since the 
payoff to the illegal producer of rejecting 
the bribe is zero, the largest bribe that the 
government official would be able to ex-
tract from the illegal producer in a take-it-
or-leave-it offer is given by:5 
 
1)  BI = (1 − ϕ)V − ϕmV.
The payoff to the government official in 
this case is
PO = BI − ϕpV = (1− ϕ)V − ϕmV − ϕpV.
That is, it is the maximum bribe that the government 
official could extract from the illegal producer minus 
the penalty pV times the probability ϕ of being caught 
by the central government.










If this condition is not satisfied, it would be in the 
best interest of the government official not to seek a 
bribe from the illegal producer. Hence, the legal pro-
ducer would reject any take-it-or-leave-it offer made 
by the official and the legal course of action would  
be taken. If the condition in equation 2 is satisfied, 
the government official would be able to extract bribes 
from the legal producer, since it becomes fully credi-
ble that he would subsequently want to reach a deal 
with the illegal producer.
Observe that the payoff to the legal producer of 
reaching a deal with the government official is:
PL = V − BL.
FIguRE 2
Sequence of moves for corruption game
Notes: I refers to illegal producer; L to legal producer; and O to government  









Make offer to L Make offer to I
L accepts L rejects I rejects I accepts
Make offer to I Make offer to L
L accepts L rejects I accepts I rejects
O allocates permit properly O allocates permit properly33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
That is, it is equal to the value of being the product 
leader net of the bribes paid. This payoff is nonran-
dom because if the central government independently 
learned about the pollution status of the innovator, it 
would conclude that the entry permit was correctly 
allocated (recall that the central government can never 
prove that a bribe payment took place). Also, the pay-
off to the legal producer of rejecting a bribe offer 
from the government official is ϕV, since with proba-
bility ϕ the illegal action will be detected by the cen-
tral government and the legal producer will become 
the product leader. Hence, the largest bribe that the 
government official will be able to extract from the 
legal producer is: 6
3)  BL = (1 − ϕ)V.
To summarize, the equilibrium of the corruption 
game is as follows. If the condition in equation 2 is 
violated, no bribes are paid. If the condition in equa-
tion 2 is satisfied, the government official extracts 
from the legal producer the bribes given by equation 3. 
In both cases, the official takes the legal course of  
action. Figure 3 provides an illustration of the equi-
librium outcome. 
Innovation decisions
In this section, I describe in detail the industry in 
which the incumbent and innovator of the previous 
section operate. The purpose is to determine how  
corruption affects the industry’s innovation rate.
The industry produces a product that comes in 
many possible qualities. At each point in time, there 
is a frontier version that dominates all previous ones. 
A single producer has the patent to this version. He 
drives all other producers out of the market and en-
joys a profit flow equal to Π. However, he loses his 
leading position whenever an innovator enters busi-
ness with a quality improvement. In this case, the  
incumbent is driven out of the market, and the inno-
vator becomes the new industry leader, which pro-
vides him the profit flow Π. 
Product innovations take place at an endoge-
nously determined rate η. At every point in time there 
are a large number of potential producers (innovators) 
that invest in research and development (R&D) in or-
der to create a new product generation. They all face 
a same cost function r(η), which describes the costs 
of generating an arrival rate equal to η.7 If an innova-
tor succeeds in creating the new product generation, 
he can apply for an entry permit. If the entry permit is 
awarded, the innovator becomes the new industry 
leader. However, entry is regulated as in the previous 
section. In particular, a government official is sent to 
inspect the pollution status of the new technology. As 
a result, the official, the incumbent producer, and the 
innovator end up playing the corruption game de-
scribed before. The probability that an entry applica-
tion is inspected by a government official is equal to 
γ, while the probability that an innovation pollutes is 
equal to ξ.
The optimization problem of an innovator is then 
the following:
4)  max {η [ξNP + (1 − ξ) NC ] − r (η)},
where NP is the value of being an innovator that pol-
lutes and NC is the value of being an innovator that 
produces with a clean technology. That is, the innova-
tor chooses the arrival rate η to maximize the expect-
ed value net of R&D costs. The optimal innovation 
rate η is characterized by the following condition:
5)  r′ (η) = ξNP + (1 − ξ) NC .
That is, the innovator equates marginal revenue to 
marginal cost. In what follows, I sketch the main 
properties of the optimal R&D investment decisions 
both from an individual point of view and at the  
industry level. The appendix provides a more  
detailed analysis. 
To start with, observe that the marginal cost 
function r′ is strictly increasing. Thus, given fixed 
values for NP and NC , there is a unique value of η that 
satisfies equation 5. While an individual innovator 
takes the values of NP and NC as given (since he is 
competitive), these values actually depend on the in-
dustry-wide innovation rate η*. Moreover, they are 
strictly decreasing in the industry-wide innovation 
rate η*. The reason is that given all other parameter 
values, an increase in η* decreases the expected 
length of time over which a producer can retain the 
leadership of a product line (that is, it increases the 
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rate at which future innovators will drive him out of 
the market). Thus, the expected value
 
N N N P C = + − ( ) ξ ξ 1
in the right-hand side of equation 5 is strictly decreas-
ing in η*. At equilibrium, the industry-wide innova-
tion rate η* that innovators take as given (and that de-
termines the expected value N) must be identical to 
the one they choose from their individual perspective. 
That is, at equilibrium we must have that the innova-
tion rate satisfies:
6) .
* * ′( ) = ( ) r N η η
Since the left-hand side of equation 6 is strictly in-
creasing in η* and the right-hand side of equation 6 is 
strictly decreasing in η*, there is a unique value of η* 
that satisfies this equation. That is, there is a unique in-
dustry equilibrium. Figure 4 illustrates this equilibrium.
We are interested in how the equilibrium innova-
tion rate η* is affected by changes in different param-
eter values. While the appendix provides a formal 
analysis, the results are quite intuitive. We saw in the 
previous section that the penalties to the government 
official and illegal producer (p and m, respectively) 
affect whether bribes are paid or not but do not affect 
the magnitude of the bribes. In particular, if the con-
dition in equation 2 is satisfied, bribes are paid. How-
ever, p and m do not enter equation 3, which describes 
the equilibrium bribes BL that the government officials 
are able to extract from the legal producers. This means 
that as long as p + m > (1 − ϕ)/ϕ, the expected value 
N  is independent of those penalties; but as soon as p + m 
becomes equal to (1 − ϕ)/ϕ, the expected value N  
plummets because now producers become subject to 
bribes. Further, decreases in p + m have no additional 
effects in N. The implications for the equilibrium  
innovation rate are shown in figure 5. The curve  N1  
describes the expected value of innovating in the case 
in which there are no bribes (that is, when p + m > 
(1− ϕ)/ϕ), while the curve N2 describes the expected 
value of innovation when producers pay bribes (that 
is, when p + m < (1 − ϕ)/ϕ). Since N2 is lower than 
N1 for every value of η, it follows that the equilibri-
um innovation rate with bribesη2
* must be lower than 
the equilibrium innovation rate when there are no 
bribesη1
*. This leads to my main result: The effects  
of penalties to corruption on equilibrium innovation 
rates are highly nonlinear. In particular, small changes 
in penalties p + m around the critical value (1 − ϕ)/ϕ 
can lead to large changes in innovation rates, while 
changes in penalties far from that critical value have 
no effects. The discontinuous dependence of the equi-
librium innovation rate η* on the total penalties p + m 
is depicted in figure 6.
The effects on the equilibrium innovation rate of 
changes in the probability of detecting corruption ϕ 
and in the fraction of entry applications that get inspect-
ed γ are more complex, since they not only determine 
whether bribes are paid, but also affect the position of 
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the curves N1 and N2 in figure 5. A numerical analysis 
of these effects is provided in the appendix.
Conclusion
I have illustrated how the rate of product innova-
tion can be affected by changes in parameter values de-
termining the amount of corruption in an industry. An 
interesting result of the analysis is that, under certain 
parameter ranges, small increases in the penalties to 
corruption or the effectiveness of detection can result 
in large increases in the amount of product innovation.
While I have not explicitly analyzed the effects 
of innovation on economic development, it is safe to 
speculate what those effects would be. To be specific, 
consider Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) endoge-
nous growth model. In that model, there is a continu-
um of product lines, each characterized by quality 
ladders of fixed increments. In each product line, 
there is always a leader producer that supplies the 
frontier quality and drives all previous producers out 
of the market. However, the arrival rate of innovators 
is optimally determined in an R&D sector. Successful 
innovators drive the incumbent leaders out of the market 
and become the new product leaders. Thus, each prod-
uct line has a similar structure as the industry consid-
ered in this article. Introducing a corruption game in 
each product line would thus deliver similar results. 
Since in Grossman and Helpman (1991) the growth 
rate of the economy is determined by the endogenous 
innovation rate, the effects of corruption found here 
would translate into growth effects. In particular, 
small increases in the penalties to corruption or the 
effectiveness of detection can lead to jumps in the 
growth rate of the economy. Thus, corruption has the 
potential of grouping countries into two distinct de-
velopment groups: fast- and slow-growing countries.
Sources:  FIguRE 6
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NOTES
1While I do not explicitly analyze the links between corruption, in-
novation, and economic growth, I sketch them in some detail in the 
conclusion. 
2The Penn World Table—maintained by the Center for International 
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania—provides purchas-
ing power parity and national income accounts converted to inter-
national prices for 188 countries for some or all of the years 1950–2004. 
For further details, please see http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. Transparency 
International is a global organization promoting anticorruption  
policies. Its Corruption Perception Index ranks countries by the 
perceived levels of corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) in 
the public and political sectors, as determined by expert assessment 
and business opinion surveys. The Corruption Perception Index 
can be downloaded from www.transparency.org.
3For example, Djankov et al. (2002) report that to meet government 
requirements for starting a business in 1999, an entrepreneur in 
Italy needed to follow 16 different procedures, pay US$3,946 in 
fees, and wait at least 62 business days to acquire the necessary 
permits. In contrast, an entrepreneur in Canada only needed to fol-
low two procedures, pay US$280, and wait for two days. An ex-
tended account of how entry regulation leads to corruption and 
bureaucratic delays is provided by De Soto (1989). However, he 
focuses on the Peruvian economy.
4Introducing a fine to polluters would significantly complicate the 
analysis of the corruption game without additional insights.
5This bribe request makes the illegal producer indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting it.
6This bribe request makes the legal producer indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting it.
7This cost function is assumed to be increasing, differentiable, and 
strictly convex. Moreover, r′ (0) = 0 and r′ (∞) = ∞.
APPENDIX: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DECISIONS AND INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM
Given the solution to the corruption game characterized 
in the main text, we can proceed to write expressions for 
NP and NC. The expected value of an innovator that does 



























Observe that when  p m + >
+ ( ) 1 ϕ
ϕ
, there are no 
bribes paid in the corruption game. Hence, the clean 
innovator obtains the value V of becoming a leader
with certainty. When  p m + <
+ ( ) 1 ϕ
ϕ
, bribes are paid 
whenever the innovator gets inspected. As a consequence, 
the innovator gets the full value V only if he is not in-
spected, an event that happens with probability (1 − γ). 
With probability γ, the (clean) innovator is inspected and 
obtains a value (net of bribes) of ϕV.
The expected value of an innovator that pollutes NP 
is given by:
NP = (1 − γ) V.
The innovator that pollutes obtains the full value of be-
coming the leader V only if he is not inspected, which 
happens with probability (1 − γ). With probability γ, the 
innovator that pollutes is inspected and is precluded 
from producing (recall that for every parameter specifi-
cation the government official always takes the legal 
course of action).
The value of being the industry leader V is given as 
follows:
  iV


























where i is the instantaneous interest rate. The flow value 
of being the leader iV is given by Π, but with arrival rate 
η, a new innovator enters the market, in which case the 
profit flow Π is permanently lost. However, there are 





p m, the loss is
avoided when the new arrival pollutes and is inspected by 
a government official, an event that happens with probabil-
ity ξγ (in this case there are no bribes imposed and the
entry permit is rejected). Also, when  p m + <
− ( ) 1 ϕ
ϕ
,
the loss is partly avoided when the new arrival pollutes 
and is inspected by a government official (again, an 
event that happens with probability ξγ). However, in this 
case, the leader is only able to retain a fraction ϕ of the 
value of being the leader V.
We are now ready to write the expected value of 
creating a new product generation in equation 4 (p. 33):
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This expected value depends on parameter values, since 
the outcome of the corruption game varies depending on 
them. As a consequence, I will index the expected value 
Nj according to the parameter region j.37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Observe that, in each parameter region j, the ex-
pected value Nj η ( ) depends on the industry’s arrival 
rate η, which is an endogenous variable of the model. In 
particular, the expected values Nj η ( ) depend negatively 
on η.  Also, it is straightforward to verify that for every 
possible value of the arrival rate η, that 
A3 2 1 ) . N N η η ( )< ( )
Observe that, since r is a convex function, r′ is in-
creasing in η. This, together with the previously men-
tioned properties for the expected values N j η ( ), allows  
us to establish that in each parameter region j there is a 
unique equilibrium arrival rateηj
* satisfying that 
′( ) = ( ) r N j j j η η
* * ,
and that these arrival rates are ordered across parameter 
regions as follows:
A4 2 1 ) .
* * η η <
As mentioned in the main text, this inequality leads 
to the main result of the article. Fixing all other parameter 
values, lower penalties on corruption p + m lead to lower 
rates of innovation. However, the relation is highly non-
linear. Reductions in p + m have no effects on rates of 
innovation as long as they leave the model within the 
same parameter region. But once the edge of a parameter 
region is approached, small reductions in p + m have 
large effects as the equilibrium innovation rate η* jumps 
from one region to the next.
The effects of the probability of detection ϕ and the 
fraction of entry applications that get inspected γ are 
more complex because they affect not only the length  
of the parameter regions but also the position of the  
expected values  N1 and  N2  in figure 5 (p. 34). To  
ease the presentation of these effects, in what follows  
I complement the analysis with a numerical example.  
It is important to point out that the example has no  
empirical content, since parameter values are not  
chosen to reproduce observations; it serves illustration 
Sources:  FIguRE A1
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Figure A2 shows how the equilibrium innovation 
rate depends on the probability of inspection γ. The fig-
ure shows that a higher probability of inspection γ de-
creases the innovation rate of the industry in a continu-
ous way. This is a general result. We see from equations 
A1 and A2 that N j η ( )decreases with γ in each case j = 1, 2. 
Since the functions depicted in figure 5 (p. 34) shift 
down as γ increases, the intersections with r′(η) take 
place at lower values of ηj
*, for each j = 1, 2. However, 
changes in γ have no effect on the parameter region that 
the economy lies on. Thus, while the innovation rate 
decreases with γ, there are no points of discontinuity.
purposes only. The example considered has the follow-
ing parameter values: ξ = 0.5, γ = 0.1, ϕ = 0.5, p = 0.8, 
m = 0, i = 0.04, Π = 1 (this is just a normalization), and  
 
 




Fixing all other parameters at their benchmark values, 
figure A1 shows how the equilibrium innovation rate 
depends on the probability of detecting corruption ϕ. 
The figure shows that a higher detection probability ϕ 
(weakly) increases the innovation rate of the industry. 
However, the dependence is discontinuous, and once the 
arrival rate jumps, it is unresponsive to further increases 
in ϕ. These properties are general. We see from equa-
tions A1 and A2 that  N j η ( )increases with ϕ when j = 2 
but is independent of ϕ when j = 1. Moreover, an in-
crease in ϕ can bring the economy from parameter re-
gion j = 2 to j = 1, entailing a jump in the arrival rate 
from η η 2 1
* * to  at the critical value for ϕ at which 
Sources:  FIguRE A2
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